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Abstract 
Property  rights  are  undoubtedly  among  the  most  important  institutions  for  economic 
efficiency. Still, by looking at reality we usually see property rights only imperfectly enforced. 
In this paper we identify uncertainty faced by an enforcer to be sufficient to explain this 
observation. This result is independent of the enforcer's risk preferences  or enforcement 
ability. While perfectly enforced property rights may readily be established in all possible 
scenarios under complete information, introducing any amount of exogenous uncertainty 
leads to imperfect enforcement. Further, even under complete information, we show how 
an  appropriator  may  create  uncertainty  endogenously  by  means  of  strategic  restraint. 
Although this means that appropriation is always possible, this situation Pareto dominates 
perfect enforcement. 
Keywords 
Property Rights, Deterrence, Uncertainty 
JEL Classification 
D02, D82, P14 1 Introduction
Among all rules and laws those that are designed to assign and enforce property rights are
probably the most important from an economic point of view. Property rights, if properly en-
forced, are the rights to control economic goods and resources, as has been stressed by Rodrik
(2000), and are as such fundamental for all market transactions. Maybe most importantly,
property rights allow the holder to obtain income from a good or resource. As an example, a
person’s incentives to work depend very much on the expected share of earned income that
is obtained. This is not very surprising and there is a lot of empirical evidence for this claim,
see for example Field (2007). Similarly, the incentives to invest hinge to a great deal on
the expected share of returns obtained, as has been shown for example in a recent study by
Hornbeck (2010). This has of course also important implications for economic development.
Mehlum et al. (2005) show in a theoretical analysis how the lack of well enforced property
rights dampens incentives to invest and so might lead to poverty traps. Similarly, property
rights enforcement is important for the internalization of externalities, as has been noted
already in the classical works of Coase (1960) and Demsetz (1964, 1967). Overall, property
rights are very important to shape incentives in various settings eﬃciently. Nevertheless,
property rights are usually only imperfectly enforced.
In this paper we identify the presence of uncertainty as suﬃcient for imperfect enforcement.
We interpret the process of enforcement as a contest game between an appropriator and an
individual trying to defend his property, the defender. If the defender deters the appropriator
from appropriation property rights are perfectly enforced. Our point of departure is a situation
absent incomplete information, where deterrence may be possible if the defender is able to
commit to enforcement eﬀort. As soon as we introduce any amount of uncertainty about
relevant characteristics of the appropriator, perfect enforcement breaks down and enforcement
is always imperfect. The actual magnitude of this uncertainty does not play a role, and neither
does the defender’s attitude towards risk or his strength. Also, the introduction of the state
does not alter this ﬁnding, even if the state is able to generate economies of scale in the
process of enforcement. Further, we show how an appropriator is able to create uncertainty
endogenously by strategically restraining himself from appropriation. The creation of this
endogenous strategic uncertainty appeases the defender and leads to imperfect enforcement.
In fact, creating strategic uncertainty endogenously is to the beneﬁt of both the appropriator
1and the defender and leads to a Pareto improvement relative to perfect enforcement.
The creation or enforcement of property and other rights has been the subject of study for
many researchers in the social sciences during the past decades. The early literature started
with the seminal works of Coase (1960), Demsetz (1964) and Becker (1968). While the ﬁrst
two articles are mainly concerned with the eﬀect of imperfect property rights enforcement
and when individuals may have an incentive to create property rights, Becker tries to answer
from a normative point of view what is the optimal extent of enforcement if there was a social
planner. About a decade later another literature developed with the aim to explain why and
how property rights may actually emerge absent any enforcing institution as the state. The
point of departure is usually a state of anarchy.1 Because in anarchy there do not exist rules
or institutions by deﬁnition, it is possible to study the prerequisites for rules and institutions,
like property rights, to emerge. Those results are important for our understanding of modern
societies. After all, enforcement of property rights is, even in the presence of a state, to a great
deal the responsibility of individuals or ﬁrms. To quote Friedman (1994), “legal rules are in
large part a superstructure erected upon an underlying structure of self-enforcing rights”. For
example, households buy lockable doors, bike locks, or erect walls and fences around their
houses, department stores hire security personnel, buy video surveillance systems or burglar
alarms. For a self-interested individual there is no reason to respect others’ possession. If an
individual can further its goals by stealing from others it will probably do exactly that. As
a consequence, property rights are inherently challenged and the possessor and appropriator
engage in a game of conﬂict or contest. Early contributions to this literature are those of
Umbeck (1977, 1981), who analyzed how claims to property evolved during the California gold
rush and showed that violence was a major impediment for the creation of secure property
rights. Other important contributions include the articles of Grossman & Kim (1995) and
Grossman (2001). There it is shown that in a contest for possession the possessor might
be able to secure his possession perfectly, if he is suﬃciently strong and able to commit to
some level of defensive eﬀort, for example by moving ﬁrst and building a wall or fence. A
very interesting paper is also that of Muthoo (2004), in which he shows how secure property
rights may emerge over time, what is similar to the results in Hafer (2006). More recent
1To our knowledge, the ﬁrst paper studying the implications of anarchy is Bush & Mayer (1974). Inﬂuential
articles analyzing economic behavior under anarchy are for example Skaperdas (1992) or Hirshleifer (1995).
For an overview consult Skaperdas (2006) or Garﬁnkel & Skaperdas (2007).
2contributions are Kolmar (2008), and Hoﬀmann (2010). Kolmar (2008) shows that even if
secure property rights emerge, production incentives are nevertheless distorted. Hoﬀmann
(2010) analyzes how property rights may emerge in a barter economy. A common theme
in these papers is that perfect enforcement is possible if the enforcer is suﬃciently strong.
However, in all of those paper uncertainty does not play a role. In this paper we highlight
the importance of taking uncertainty into account.
We analyze a game of conﬂict in which a defender has the opportunity to publicly commit
to a particular level of defensive eﬀort or fortiﬁcation to fend oﬀ an appropriator. Because
there are appropriators of diﬀerent abilities and the defender does not know which appropri-
ator is trying to steal from him, the enforcer faces exogenous uncertainty. This seems quite
realistic, since, loosely speaking, people usually do not know in advance who is going to try
to break into their houses, or whether somebody will attempt to break in at all. We show
that this simple structure is suﬃcient to destroy the possibility of secure property rights as
an equilibrium outcome of the conﬂict game. The presence of uncertainty about the appro-
priator’s type gives rise to either insecure or imperfect property rights in equilibrium. The
deeper reason for this ﬁnding is, metaphorically speaking, that all possible appropriators will
stand in front of the same wall. In order to defend property at lowest possible costs, the
defender builds the wall only slightly higher than the appropriator can climb. When there
is uncertainty about the appropriator’s ability it is not clear what is the optimal height and
the defender builds a wall that is optimal in expectation, and thus deters only some average
appropriator. We show that it will never be in the interest of the defender to build the wall
high enough to deter all types of appropriators. If the wall was built high enough to deter
also the most able appropriator, it would always be beneﬁcial to decrease the height of the
wall slightly, since this ensures ﬁrst order gains against all less able types, whereas losses are
approximately equal to zero at the margin against the highest type. In a ﬁrst step we analyze
the conﬂict game using the canonical lottery contest success function (CSF) to model the
outcome. We provide exact conditions for diﬀerent degrees of security of property rights to
emerge and derive a formula which yields the ex-ante probability of successfully defending
the good or resource. We interpret this probability as the degree of enforcement of prop-
erty rights. We then proceed and show that the result of imperfect enforcement holds quite
generally and does not depend on the uncertainty preferences or the absence of the state.
3Finally, we show how an appropriator or criminal may restrain himself in the conﬂict game to
create uncertainty strategically. This has the eﬀect of appeasing the defender, and so lowers
his defensive eﬀort. As a consequence, both the appropriator and defender are better of in
expectation and therefore decreasing the security of property leads to a Pareto improvement.
We therefore develop a theoretical rationale for imperfect property rights enforcement.
A consequence of this result is that externalities are unlikely to be completely internal-
ized, implying the existence of a fundamental ineﬃciency. Also, as noted before, this causes
distortions in many important dimensions such as the decision to work, how much to invest,
or to buy durable consumption goods, a ﬁnding which is in line with the works of Muthoo
(2004) and Kolmar (2008). Therefore, there are two major ineﬃciencies related to property
rights. First, in order to enforce property rights valuable resources have to be spent. Second,
because of the nature of the problem of enforcement, contingent security investment is not
possible and thus heterogeneity creates strategic uncertainty and thus leads to imperfectly
enforced property rights. This causes distorted incentives in many important dimensions.
However, our analysis also suggests that perfectly enforced property rights are not eﬃcient
either, what is in line with Becker (1968).
While the primary objective of this paper is to highlight the importance of uncertainty
for property rights enforcement, we also contribute to the literature on the theory of contests.
First, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium of a ratio-form contest with sequential
moves and arbitrary type uncertainty. We thereby generalize the analysis of Linster (1993)
along many lines. Our main result suggests that in our setting of type uncertainty the prob-
ability to win the contest may be negatively correlated with the expected relative strength of
a player, which seems counterintuitive at ﬁrst glance. Finally, we show how a player may use
strategic restraint as a means to create uncertainty for his own beneﬁt, a mechanism similar
to that in Epstein & Nitzan (2004). Other papers dealing with informational asymmetries in
contests and conﬂict are for example Hurley & Shogren (1998), W¨ arneryd (2003), Slantchev
(2010), and Denter & Sisak (2011). Hurley & Shogren (1998) look at rent-seeking games with
one-sided asymmetric information and show how diﬀerent beliefs about the strength of the
opponent alter equilibrium behavior. W¨ arneryd (2003) analyzes contest games between two
players that are ignorant about their own type in the setting of a common-value conﬂict (that
is, both contestants value the prize equally). Slantchev (2010) analyzes how choosing a po-
4sition in a bargaining game prior to a possible conﬂict functions as a signal about a player’s
actual strength. He ﬁnds that it is often optimal to appeal to Sun Tzu’s principle of “feigning
weakness”. Denter & Sisak (2011) study players’ incentives to voluntarily exchange informa-
tion. They show that the famous dictum “know thy enemy” is not necessarily true. Another
recent related article is due to Chassang & i Miquel (2010). Here the authors highlight the
importance of uncertainty for the stability of peace, respectively for the outbreak of overt
conﬂict or war. They show that uncertainty generates incentives to start preemptive conﬂict,
and thereby uncertainty makes deterrence less likely. This is in line with our ﬁndings in this
paper.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we describe the basic model and
deﬁne diﬀerent degrees of security of property, relating to the extent that property rights
are enforced. Section 3 analyzes a simple game of self-enforcement of property rights to
develop an intuition for our main result and discusses comparative static results. Section 4
studies a generalized model and shows that the developed intuition is quite general. Section
5 shows that also in the presence of a state our results do not change, even though the state
may generate economies of scale in the process of enforcement. Section 6 demonstrates how
strategic uncertainty may be created endogenously in our framework. Section 7 discusses our




Consider two players i ∈ {D,A}, where the letters are mnemonics for defender and appropri-
ator respectively. D is in possession of a good which is his property. A wants to appropriate
or steal this good. Enforcement of property rights is in the responsibility of D, which may
for example be due to a weak state. In the context of property rights this assumption is
quite realistic. Clearance rates of property crimes are consistently low in most countries. For
example, the average clearance rate of burglaries in the U.S. in 2002 was some 14 percent,
if victims reported the theft. However, it is estimated that only every third victim actually
reports burglary (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). There is also evidence that burglars
5do not think about the consequences they face in the event of being caught. The deter-
rence eﬀect of punishment is insigniﬁcant (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). That being
said for the U.S., public enforcement of property rights is in most other countries even lower.2
Hence, the major impediment for burglary and related crimes is usually private spending for
self-enforcement.
D and A may be heterogeneous. For speciﬁcity, we assume they are heterogeneous in their
valuation of the good vi. D’s valuation for the good is common knowledge and is given by vD,
whereas A has private information about his valuation vA. vA is drawn from G(vA), which
has the compact and strictly positive support [vA,vA] ⊂ R+ and is diﬀerentiable. All this is
common knowledge. Throughout the paper we contrast the incomplete information scenario
to one in which there is complete information. In the latter case deterrence and therefore
secure property rights are the outcome if vD is suﬃciently high. As will become apparent
later on this does not hold true under incomplete information.
Note that although we model heterogeneity of players by emphasizing their diﬀerent util-
ities derived from the good, our results are identical if heterogeneity in other dimensions is
added. In fact, it is uncertainty about A’s willingness to put in eﬀective eﬀort that matters,
which is also inﬂuenced by other factors like marginal costs and eﬀectiveness of eﬀort.










and pA = 1 − pD. In Section 4 we show that our results hold more generally. pA(xD,0) = 1
reﬂects that the good is in D’s possession in the ﬁrst place, and A needs to spend at least
some resources to steal it. Each player i chooses eﬀort xi, and costs of eﬀort are Ci(xi) = xi.
We look at sequential moves where D moves ﬁrst, respectively is able to make a commitment.
This is a natural assumption in our context. Fortiﬁcation or target hardening is usually a
durable good and we usually see somebody erecting a wall or a fence around his house before
2The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal rank countries according to the degree of publicly
enforced property rights on a 0 to 100 scale. For example, a score of 40 suggests “[t]he court system is highly
ineﬃcient, and delays are so long that they deter the use of the court system” and “expropriation is possible”.
Countries with a score equal to or lower than 40 include Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia in South America
or Croatia, Serbia, and Russia in Europe. See http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/.
6somebody else tries to break in.






p(xD,xA(vA;xD)) dG(vA) − xD. (2)




UT(xD,xA) = vA (1 − p(xD,xA)) − xA. (3)
Because D does not know the type of A we have an incomplete information game and the
equilibrium concept we employ is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Concerning property rights
The aim of this paper is to give a rationale for imperfectly enforced property rights and to
show that strategic uncertainty is suﬃcient to impede perfect enforcement. To facilitate the
analysis we now deﬁne diﬀerent levels of property rights enforcement.
The appropriator spends eﬀort xA in the contest. If xA(vA;xD) > 0 type vA is active
and challenges D’s property. If xA(vA;xD) = 0 type vA stays passive. Deﬁne π to be the
equilibrium probability of observing xA(vA;xD) > 0. We can use this convention to deﬁne
three diﬀerent regimes of security of property:
Deﬁnition 1. Property rights are
1. secure, if the equilibrium probability of appropriative activity is zero, that is the good
is deﬁnitively unchallenged and π = 0 in equilibrium. Property rights are perfectly
enforced.
2. imperfect, if the equilibrium probability of appropriative activity is strictly between zero
and one, and 0 < π < 1 in equilibrium.
3. insecure, if the equilibrium probability of appropriative activity is equal to one, π = 1.
The deﬁnition of secure property rights is identical to those in, for example, Grossman (2001)
or Kolmar (2008). However, while it is usually assumed that property rights are either insecure
or secure, we introduce a hybrid, imperfect property. From an empirical point of view this is
7probably the most relevant category. Ex-ante there is a strictly positive probability to suﬀer
from attempted theft, and thus the probability to lose possession is also positive; however,
ex-post it could well be that no theft was tried. Therefore, it may turn out that property
remains unchallenged even though property is not secure according to the deﬁnition. If a
theft attempt happens for sure property rights are insecure.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Complete information: the benchmark
To establish a benchmark we let G(vA) converge to one point, such that vA = vA = vA. In
this case there is no uncertainty and hence there is complete information. The equilibrium of
this game is our benchmark.











Proof. See for example Linster (1993).
From this it follows that A does not spend any eﬀort in equilibrium if and only if vD ≥
2vA. Therefore, if D is suﬃciently strong there is deterrence and property rights are secure.
Otherwise, property rights are insecure. Imperfect property rights cannot emerge. We now
turn to the incomplete information game.
3.2 Incomplete information
In this section we look at how strategic uncertainty aﬀects the level of security of property
in equilibrium. If D moves ﬁrst or is able to make a commitment he considers A’s optimal
reaction while optimizing. A’s reaction function is easily found:
xA(vA;xD) = max{0,
√
xD vA − xD}. (4)
It follows immediately that the appropriator tries to appropriate only when xD < vA. For
all higher eﬀorts xD there is deterrence. For property rights to be secure this has to hold for




A dG(vA), where ˜ v is the marginal type of A
participating actively in the contest, ˜ v = max{vA,xD}. Note that θ(˜ v) = θ(xD), since for all
xD < vA the density of vA is zero. To determine D’s optimization problem this formulation






xD θ(xD)] − xD.
A simply reacts according to his reaction function (4). Proposition 2 shows the equilibrium.









where ˜ v = max{vD,x+











D’s eﬀort in equilibrium is monotonically increasing in vD and always strictly positive.
However, this is not true for A, who might stay passive. If all types of A stay passive we would
have secure property in equilibrium. If to the contrary all types of A are active property is
insecure. We next look for a condition that tells us when this is the case. It is obvious from
(4) that the appropriator with the lowest valuation stays passive in the conﬂict whenever
x+
D ≥ vA. It is this type who is deterred ﬁrst and therefore this type’s equilibrium eﬀort
determines whether property is insecure or not.
Corollary 1. All types of appropriators are active in the equilibrium of the conﬂict game if
and only if




Accordingly, if this condition is met property rights are insecure and π = 1 − G(vA) = 1. If
this condition is not met some types of A stay passive and property rights are imperfect or
9secure.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 2 and (4).
The corollary tells us that when D gets too strong relative to A he spends so much eﬀort
in equilibrium that some types of A prefer to stay inactive in equilibrium, that is partial
deterrence occurs. In order to have secure property, however, full deterrence is necessary. To
answer whether property can be secure in an equilibrium we need to look more closely at x+
D.
In particular, property is secure if and only if x+
D ≥ vA.
Corollary 2. In equilibrium D always chooses eﬀort
x+
D < vA, (6)
implying π = 1 − G(x+
D) > 0 and hence property rights are never secure.
Proof. If we let x+
D → vA on the RHS of (5), θ(˜ v) gets zero in the limit, and so does the RHS.
This yields a contradiction since then 0 = x+
D = vA > 0.
The corollary shows that strategic uncertainty is suﬃcient to explain imperfectly enforced
property rights. Note that the result does not depend on the possible range of vA, since any
interval [vA,vA] with positive measure suﬃces. Only in the limit, when vA = vA = vA, secure
property can be sustained in an equilibrium.
What is the intuition for this result? Assume vD ≥ 2vA. Absent strategic uncertainty D
would spend exactly xD = vA ∈ [vA,vA], hence deter A and enforce property rights perfectly.
But when there is strategic uncertainty he prefers not to do that and enforces only imperfectly.
To see the intuition behind the result it is illustrative to look at a simple example. Assume
vD = 8 and vA ∈ {2,4} with equal probabilities. Without uncertainty D would deter both
types of A and secure property rights perfectly. In the presence of asymmetric information D
faces strategic uncertainty in his decision making. By spending xD = 4 he would deter both
types of A, however, he would also spend too much with a probability of 50 percent. Eﬀort
higher than 2 has, with a 50 percent probability, no beneﬁt at all. By increasing eﬀort the
expected marginal beneﬁt from eﬀort decreases faster in the presence of uncertainty, because
at the same time the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort and the probability that eﬀort has a beneﬁt
at all decrease. Because by increasing eﬀort the fraction of deterred types of A increases, the

















Figure 1: Derivative of D’s utility function with respect to xD against both players with vD = 8,
vA = 4, and vA = 2. In the right panel we see the derivative of D’s objective function in case vA = 4 is
zero at xD = 4. In the left panel we see that at this eﬀort the derivative in case of vA = 2 is negative,
implying the overall derivative has to be negative, too, and therefore the ﬁrst order condition for an
optimum cannot hold.
marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort decreases not only due to diminishing marginal products but also
as a consequence of a decreasing probability that eﬀort has a positive beneﬁt at all. However,
eﬀorts have always to be paid in full, whether or not eﬀort is eﬀective. In our example the
marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort at xD = 4 is with equal probability zero and one, while marginal
costs are equal to one for sure. Hence, the ﬁrst order condition for an optimum does not
hold but eﬀort has to be lower in equilibrium. This intuition is also graphically illustrated in
Figure 1. In the case of a continuous distribution as described in the model, the probability
of deterrence is continuously increasing in xD in the interval [vA,vA]. Therefore, as xD → vA
the probability of deterrence approaches one, and therefore the expected marginal beneﬁt of
eﬀort approaches zero.
Having shown that property rights are not secure in equilibrium, it is of interest to look
more closely at the ex-ante probability that D actually keeps the good. If the probability to
lose possession is economically not signiﬁcant the implications of uncertainty for an individual
are rather negligible. There are again two diﬀerent sources of security of property: ﬁrst, some
types of A might be deterred, and this increases the probability of keeping the good. Second,
those types that are not deterred do not succeed for sure but get the good only with some
probability, which is determined by the CSF. In other words, because of deterrence, there is
some probability not to encounter an appropriator at all, and there is also some probability
to keep the good conditional on having a conﬂict. We need to consider both probabilities,
what simply corresponds to integrating over the CSF, given the equilibrium strategies:


















A are deﬁned as in Proposition 2.
Proof. This follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the CSF in (2) and Proposition 2.
To get an idea of the magnitude of the impact of uncertainty it is instructive to proceed
with an example distribution. For speciﬁcity, assume the appropriator’s valuation is uniformly
distributed on [(1 − σ)v,v], σ ∈ [0,1], and assume vD = 2v. This ensures that the defender
would perfectly secure property rights against all realizations of the appropriator’s valuation
if he had perfect information. σ is a spread parameter and may vary between zero and
one, the former being the limit when uncertainty vanishes. When σ increases uncertainty
gets larger. The expected valuation of the appropriator, however, decreases. The following
formula establishes the connection between the spread and the ex-ante probability to keep
possession in our example:
φu(σ) =
σ(σ + 3) + 4
(σ + 2)2 . (7)
A nice property is that φu is independent of v, what makes it quite easy to analyze. If there
was no uncertainty, σ = 0, we get φu(0) = 1, as we should have expected. As uncertainty
increases φu decreases. In Figure 2 we plot φu against σ. An interesting question is now
how uncertainty translates into the degree of enforcement of property rights. For example,
if we are interested in ﬁnding the value of σ necessary to generate an ex-ante chance of one
or 5 % to lose possession we ﬁnd σ1% = 0.04168 or σ5% = 0.25403 respectively. Therefore, if
uncertainty is about 25 % relative to v, which is less than 13 % relative to vD, the probability
to lose is some 5 %. However, φu cannot fall below 8/9 ≈ 88.9%, reﬂecting that D is still
the stronger player. Actually, as σ increases the expected valuation of A decreases, and as a
consequence D becomes relatively stronger in expectation.
Note that in the example the probability to win the contest is actually negatively correlated
to the ratio of expected valuation, κ ≡ E[vD]/E[vA] = vD/E[vA], something that never
happens absent imperfect information. The intuition is that higher uncertainty beneﬁts D













Figure 2: Left panel: The ex-ante probability φu to lose property as a function of σ, if vA ∈ [(1−σ)v,v]
and vD = 2v. Right panel: Expected relative valuation κ ≡ E[vD]/E[vA] = 4
2−σ as a function of σ.
While φu is strictly monotonically decreasing in σ the opposite is true for κ. Therefore, in the presence
of uncertainty κ may be a poor measure of strength in a contest, contrary to complete information
contests.
because with a given level of eﬀort the fraction of deterred appropriators is increasing. This
makes it attractive to lower eﬀort to save costs, but this necessarily brings some formerly
deterred types back into the game. As a consequence, D is better oﬀ but loses more often. A
consequence of this ﬁnding is that standard measures of strength in contests, as for example
the valuation, marginal costs, or eﬀort productivity, are not necessarily meaningful in the
presence of uncertainty.
4 A general model
In this section we now show that our main result in Corollary 2 does not depend on the
particular CSF we employed above to model the conﬂict, nor on the assumption of uncertainty
neutrality. We proceed by ﬁrst proving that deterrence is generally possible, and then show
that under strategic uncertainty full deterrence cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
Each player i ∈ {D,A} values the contested good by vi. Both derive utility from wealth,





vi − xi if i wins in the contest,
−xi else.
A player’s utility is deﬁned over wealth and given by ui = ui(wi) where u′
i is strictly positive
and ﬁnite and u′′
i ≤ 0. So we allow for risk aversion. Both players put eﬀort xi ≥ 0. D’s






f(xD)+f(xA) if f(xD) + f(xA) > 0,
1 else,
(8)
where f(0) = 0, f′ > 0 and f′′ ≤ 0.3 A wins with a probability pA = 1−pD. (8) is a standard
CSF which has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996). For a micro foundation of it see for
example Baye & Hoppe (2003). If we let f(x) = x this is the CSF we employed before.
Player i’s von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function is
Ui(xi,xj) = pi(xi,xj)ui(vi − xi) + (1 − pi(xi,xj))ui(−xi). (9)
As before D is able to publicly commit eﬀort, for example by moving ﬁrst. The following
lemma is now important to prove our main result later on.
Lemma 1. Assume each player maximizes a von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility
function as deﬁned in (9) and probabilities are determined by (8). Denote A’s best response
by xA(vA;xD). Then there exists µ(vA) such that
1. if xD ≥ µ(vA) the optimal response is xA(vA;xD) = 0,
2. if xD < µ(vA) the optimal response is xA(vA;xD) > 0,
3. and µ(vA) is increasing in vA, µ′(vA) > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
The lemma states that in the above described framework for each type of A there exists a
unique ﬁnite level of eﬀort xD that is necessary to deter A and so to secure property rights.
This threshold level is increasing in the valuation of A. The lemma is important because
it states that deterrence is technologically possible, so we do not assume the result of the
following proposition by making deterrence infeasible:
Proposition 3. Let the distribution of types of A be G(vA) with density g(vA) and support
[vA,vA] ⊂ R+, where vA < vA and denote D’s optimal eﬀort by x+
D. Then in equilibrium it
3In an earlier version of this paper we show that our results also hold for a more general class of CSFs that
allow for deterrence under full information.
14always holds that x+
D < µ(vA) and as a consequence thereof there is never full deterrence and
property rights are never perfectly enforced.
Proof. See appendix.
The result that a very small amount of incomplete information suﬃces to guarantee im-
perfect enforcement is quite general. Apart from property rights enforcement this is also
interesting in other circumstances. For example, in international relations piling stocks of
defensive weapons is often used as a deterrent for other countries to declare overt conﬂict or
war. However, in the presence of uncertainty deterrence is possible only probabilistically, as
we have shown. This result is similar to a recent result of Chassang & i Miquel (2010), who
show that a little amount of incomplete information can impede deterrence and hence lead
to overt conﬂict, because uncertainty may create incentives for preemptive attacks.
5 When there is a state
The above reasoning immediately carries over to the case of state enforced property rights, or
property rights which are partly state and partly self-enforced, as for example in Konrad & Skaperdas
(2010). Even if the state is able to generate economies of scale in the process of enforcement,
this does not change our results as long as marginal costs of enforcement are positive. To
see this assume the following simple extension of the model in Section 2. As before, D may
spend xD for self-enforcement of property rights. However, now total eﬀective enforcement
eﬀort is e(γ1,γ2,xD) ≡ γ1xD + γ2, where the γ1 and γ2 are enforcement instruments under
the control of the state. γ2 may be interpreted as a guaranteed minimum level of enforcement
eﬀort, whereas γ1 inﬂuences D’s marginal costs of eﬀective enforcement eﬀort, for example
because the state subsidizes lockable doors and burglar alarms (γ2 > 1). As a consequence,






Let the state’s cost functions be C1(γ1) and C2(γ2) with strictly positive marginal costs. The
sequence of events is the following:
1. The state determines γ1 and γ2.
152. D determines xD.
3. A determines xA.
We assume the state moves ﬁrst because usually states are longer lived than individuals and
an individual takes usually as given the level of state enforcement. That D moves second







dG(vA)vS − C1(γ1) − C2(γ2),
taking into account the optimal reactions of both D and A. It is straightforward to show that
for A and D this situation is now strategically equivalent to the one in Section 3, except that
D’ marginal costs of eﬀort are now 1/γ1 and he is constrained to choose eﬀort e ≥ γ2. Hence,
he will always choose xD < (vA − γ2)/γ1 unless γ1 = ∞ or γ2 = vA. In those cases, however,
the state is the de facto single enforcer of property rights. So it suﬃces to focus on the state’s
behavior without taking into account D’s optimal reaction to study whether there may be
full deterrence. The state is in the identical position as D in our baseline model above with
the only diﬀerence being the cost function. But since marginal costs are strictly positive, it
follows immediately from the earlier discussions that the state does not fully deter A, either.
The derivative of the state’s objective function at γ2 = vA is −C2(vA) < 0, and at γ1 = ∞ is
−C1(∞) < 0. Therefore, the state will not fully deter A, either, even though it may be able
to generate economies of scale in the process of enforcement.
6 Endogenous strategic uncertainty
While we showed above that for arbitrary uncertainty or heterogeneity property rights en-
forcement is imperfect or insecure, we now attempt to explain why there is uncertainty in the
ﬁrst place. First, of course, individuals diﬀer for example in their tastes or their abilities. This
is one source of uncertainty, which we may term as exogenous uncertainty. There is, how-
ever, another dimension which may be created in the game and we refer to it as endogenous
strategic uncertainty henceforth.
Remember that in a deterrence equilibrium the appropriator gets nothing. If there is
uncertainty, however, he gets a positive payoﬀ in expectation. Therefore, the appropriator
16has an incentive to create uncertainty endogenous. He could do this for example by creating
uncertainty about his ability. However, to do this a defender should know the identity of a
thief, but this is arguably not the typical case. Another option A has is to inﬂuence instead
of D’s belief about his type D’s probability to become a victim of attempted theft, and to
create uncertainty in this way. One source of this endogenously created uncertainty is related
to the number of possible victims of theft. Another source is related to strategic restraint.
We now present a simple three player model to develop the intuition. In Appendix B we show
that the intuition carries over easily to more general cases.
Assume there are two individuals Di, i = 1,2, each possessing a good of value vDi.
Further, there is an appropriator with valuation vA. All players’ characteristics are common
knowledge. As before, Di is able to commit to a particular level of defensive eﬀort. The
conﬂict is decided according to the ratio form CSF in (1). The new element is the probability
with which A tries to steal from i, qi. This probability is a function of two decisions: First,
A may decide not to steal at all, what happens with a probability 1−r to which he is able to
commit. This assumption is not unrealistic. One explanation for this comes from a dynamic
game, in which Di bases his decision on how much to spend for fortiﬁcation on a historical
measure of property crime in his neighborhood. If the appropriator decides to attempt more
break-ins, that is to increase r, the overall level of crime increases and as a consequence the
level of protection will increase, too. Therefore, A will choose this probability dynamically
optimal, and this probability may well be smaller than one. Second, returning to our above
burglary example, burglars usually do not limit their activity to burglary or property crimes,
but engage in a wider range of criminal activities such as violent and drug related crimes
(Rengert & Wasilchick, 2000). That means there is a valuable outside option and a burglar
may well restrain himself from burglary for a while so as to give a proprietor no incentive
to increase security investments. Hence, our setup can be interpreted as a reduced form of
a richer model of conﬂict in which commitment may arise endogenously. Second, if A steals
he has to decide from whom to steal. Let m1 be the probability that he steals from D1, and
m2 = 1 − m1 the probability that he steals from D2. Then we have qi = rmi. We may
interpret 1 − r and mi as diﬀerent measures of strategic restraint of A. Restraining himself
decreases the probability that D1 or D2 need to protect their property and hence decrease
their incentives to invest in protection.
17We solve the game using backwards induction. In the last stage, provided he tries to steal
from i, A chooses eﬀort xTi. As before, this is given by his reaction function xTi(xDi,vA) =
√






+ (1 − qi)
 






+ (1 − qi)
 
− xDi.








We can now use this to determine A’s expected equilibrium utility in the subgame in which






In equilibrium A has to randomize between stealing from D1 or D2. To see this assume
he goes with certainty to D1. This immediately implies he will never go to D2, so that
q2 = 0. As a consequence, D2 will optimally choose xD2 = 0 (see (10)). But then it would
be optimal to increase m2 slightly, since he wins there for sure and makes ﬁrst order gains.
As a consequence, he must randomize in equilibrium.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium A randomizes whether to steal from D1 or D2 according to a






where i,j = 1,2 and i  = j.
Proof. This follows immediately from the above discussion and equating A’s subgame payoﬀs
˜ u+
T1 and ˜ u+
T2, taking into account that qi = r   mi.4
The lemma shows that A approaches a stronger player with a lower probability. Because
he needs to appease the stronger player more, this is also intuitive. It also implies that if a
4There are also other values of mi equating A’s payoﬀs. However, this is the only solution satisfying
0 < mi < 1 for all parameter values. As discussed above, this is condition has to hold in an equilibrium.
18player increases his eﬀectiveness of defensive eﬀort, say D1 increases vD1, he inﬂicts a negative
externality on D2, since then A would approach him more often which decreases his utility.
For a discussion of this argument see de Meza & Gould (1992).
We now show how A chooses r optimally to complete the analysis. From the above













The next lemma gives the solution to this problem:









From inspection of r+ it is easily veriﬁed that for vA suﬃciently small A proﬁts from
strategically restraining himself. If he is relatively weak he gains from appeasing D1 and D2
due to strategic restraint, or, to put it diﬀerently, by keeping the level of crime low. From













The probability to steal from Di is increasing in the valuation of A, but bounded from
above by vj/(vi + vj). Thus, there always remains uncertainty. In general, the weaker A
relative to both D1 and D2, the more strategic uncertainty he chooses, that is the lower is r.
In addition, because he randomizes between D1 and D2, he further increases this uncertainty.
After all, the probability that A does not try to steal from Di is 1 − qi = 1 − mi r, which is
decreasing in both r and mi. The important point we want to make is now captured by this
proposition:
Proposition 4. If A is suﬃciently weak it is in his interest to create strategic uncertainty
19by restraining himself from stealing. This appeases Di and dilutes his incentives to invest in
fortiﬁcation. As a consequence, the probability that Di successfully defends against an attempt
of A to steal is strictly below 1 and equal to
ψ+









From the point of view of the society, the ex-ante probability of enforcement as deﬁned in
Corollary 3, that is, the probability that ex-post everybody is still in possession of his belong-
ings, is
φ+ = 1 − r(1 − ψ+) < 1.
As a consequence, enforcement is always imperfect.
Proof. This follows from the above discussion.
Even without heterogeneity or uncertainty, A is able to endogenously create uncertainty
that leads to imperfect enforcement. He has an incentive to strategically restrain himself from
stealing to increase the chances of success when he tries. Strategic restraint, as we modeled it,
can happen in two ways. First, the appropriator can decrease the overall probability of theft.
This appeases all individuals he could steal from. Second, he randomizes about from whom
to steal. This decreases for each individual the probability of being a victim and therefore
leads to additional appeasement. The magnitude of this eﬀect is increasing in the size of
the population, so that in a large neighborhood or society for each individual the probability
that somebody steals from her is lower, holding r ﬁxed. This allows A to increase r and so
to gain. Of course, this also would make it more proﬁtable to become an appropriator. In
Appendix B you can ﬁnd a discussion in which we show that this result holds true also in
a larger society with nA appropriators and nD = n − nA possible victims, where “profession
choice” is endogenous, as in for example Konrad & Skaperdas (2010) and Dal B´ o & Dal B´ o
(2009).
It is worth noting that, although enforcement is imperfect, all individuals gain from un-
certainty. For the appropriator this is easily seen, because he improves his payoﬀ from zero
to something positive. But also for the proprietors this is true. They could always simply
copy their behavior in the absence of uncertainty. However, they do not, but decrease their
20eﬀorts. Their payoﬀ conditional on being approached by A would remain identical, but the
probability of such an event is lower. As a consequence, they must be better of, too.
Strategic restraint in our model is similar to the strategic restraint discussed in Epstein & Nitzan
(2004). However, in their article restraint means demanding less, or strategically decreasing
the prize one ﬁghts for. Still, the eﬀect is similar: strategic restraint is a means to appease
the opponent and so to increase one’s payoﬀ.
7 Discussion
Property rights and other rules and laws will not be perfectly enforced in an equilibrium.
But what is the deeper reason for that? In our framework we found that inframarginal losses
against all already deterred types drive the result. However, on a more fundamental level the
reason is that because of uncertainty it is not possible to make contingent defensive eﬀorts.
Uncertainty about the appropriator’s ability or strategic uncertainty created by the appro-
priator force defenders to built the same defense for all possible contingencies or states of the
world, and it is then not optimal to deter all appropriative activities. This enables oﬀenders
always to make positive expected rents, which would not be the case without uncertainty.
This parallels many ﬁndings from the economics of information. For example, it is precisely
the impossibility to write type contingent contracts that drive the results in the seminal work
of Akerlof (1970). Because sellers have to charge the market price for all types of cars, leading
to a race to the bottom in quality, only bad quality cars survive, yielding another application
of Gresham’s law. In our example it is not possible to built up type or state contingent fortiﬁ-
cation. Note that this holds true for any number of policy instruments, as long as contingent
instruments are not feasible.
Moreover, appropriators and other violators gain from uncertainty, and thus receive in-
formation rents. We have seen this best in Section 6, where the appropriator endogenously
created uncertainty optimally. That uncertainty beneﬁts some parties and allows them to re-
ceive information rents is something we ﬁnd quite often in the contract theory and principal-
agent literature. For example, in a Baron & Myerson (1982) regulation problem, where the
authority does not know the cost function of the monopolist, we usually ﬁnd the low cost
types to beneﬁt from the possibility of high cost types. Another example for such information
rents is second degree price discrimination.
21Finally, on a more technical note, for deterrence to be technically possible appropriators’
and violators’ reaction functions need to be downward sloping and must cross the abscissa at
some point. Equivalently, eﬀorts need to be strategic substitutes over a given range of the
reaction function. This is what we ﬁnd in standard oligopoly models with quantity compe-
tition. In this respect Cournot oligopoly models and standard (imperfectly discriminating)
contest models are similar, as has been noted by Mehlum & Moene (2002) and others. How-
ever, while in Cournot competition we ﬁnd strategic substitutes over the whole range of the
strategy space, this is not true in contest models, in which we usually ﬁnd hump-shaped
best responses. For low values of the opponent’s eﬀort we ﬁnd strategic complements and
strategic substitutes only later (Dixit, 1987). However, if we want to analyze deterrence this
is exactly the region we are interested in. So, because we ﬁnd property rights are never secure
in a contest with uncertainty, exogenously or endogenously determined, that directly implies
that in Cournot oligopoly models with uncertainty a Stackelberg leader will never deter all
possible types of competing ﬁrms, too. This is in line with Gal-Or (1987), who showed that
in an environment with uncertainty “the preemptive capabilities of a Stackelberg leader are
reduced”.
A Mathematical appendix









s.t. xA = max{
√
vA xD − xD,0},
or equivalently
G(˜ v)vD + vD
√
xDθ(˜ v) − xD,
where ˜ v = max{x+




A dG(vA) as deﬁned above in Section 3. To
prove existence of a maximum it is suﬃcient to note that this function is continuous (since
it is diﬀerentiable) on the compact and convex set [0,vD], and therefore it follows from the
extreme value theorem that a maximum exists. Uniqueness and the applicability of the ﬁrst
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Proof of Lemma 1. Given the above assumptions A maximizes








It is easy to see that his utility from staying passive in the contest, that is from spending
eﬀort xA = 0, is u0 ≡ uA(0). Moreover, all eﬀorts xA > vA are strictly dominated. Denote the
utility level from putting xA = vA by uvA ≡ pA(xA,xD)uA(0)+(1−pA(xA,xD))uA(−vA) ≤ u0.





















Except for the ﬁrst term all of those terms are negative in sign. The ﬁrst two terms are
the impact of increasing eﬀort marginally on winning, while the third and fourth term de-
scribe the eﬀect on losing. Increasing eﬀort has two opposing eﬀects on the winning utility.
First, winning becomes more likely, what is positive. Second, if he wins he gets less, what
is negative. The third and fourth term are both negative, reﬂecting that increasing eﬀort
23decreases the probability to lose and at the same time decreases the utility in the event of
losing. It is straightforward to verify that I is strictly decreasing in xA. That directly implies
f(xA)/(f(xA)+f(xD))uA(vA −xA) is strictly concave and is hence either a monotonic func-
tion in xA, increasing or decreasing, or its graph is inverse U-shaped. Because II is negative
EuA must also be either monotonic in xA, increasing or decreasing, or it is inverse U-shaped.
However, we know that u0 > uvA, implying that it cannot be monotonically increasing and
must be decreasing on some interval. Of course, if EuA is inverse U-shaped ∆ must be zero
at some point, at which utility is strictly higher than uA. Then the best response must
be positive, xA(vA;xD) > 0. If the derivative is strictly decreasing A’s optimal choice is
xA(vA;xD) = 0. To ﬁnd out which of those two possible solutions is the correct one we have




[uA(vA) − uA(0)] − u′
A(0).
It is now easily veriﬁed by inspection of ∆|xA=0 that this is a monotonic function in xD and
that there exists a threshold value ¯ xD = µA(vA), such that
Sign[∆|xA=0] =

   
   
+ if xD < µA(vA),
0 if xD = µA(vA),
− if xD > µA(vA).
If xD ≥ µA(vA) it is true that ∆|xA=0 is either zero or negative. Otherwise ∆|xA=0 is
positive. From the above discussion it follows immediately that xA(vA;xD) > 0 if and only if









from which it immediately follows that µ(vA) is continuously diﬀerentiable and µ′(vA) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. In Lemma 1 we found that there exists a threshold level of eﬀort
xD denoted by µ(v), which is strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable. Therefore, its inverse
24vA = µ−1(xD) exists and is also continuously diﬀerentiable. We then deﬁne
ω(xD) ≡ µ−1(xD).
ω(xD) is the marginal type vA that is deterred given eﬀort xD. If ω(xD) < vA all thieves are
active. ω(xD) ≥ vA implies all thieves are deterred.





















The derivative with respect to xD is the following:














































Fortunately, we are able to boil down this expression signiﬁcantly. To show that xD can-
not optimally be equal to or larger than µ(vA), it is suﬃcient to show that Γ|xD=µ(vA) is
negative. Therefore, using pD(xD,xT) = f(xD)/(f(xD) + f(xT)), let xD = µ(vA) and note
that ω(µ(vA)) = vA and G(vA) = 1 by deﬁnition. This simpliﬁes the derivative already
signiﬁcantly:














Now we can use that xA(vA;µ(vA)) = 0 by deﬁnition of µ(vA)) as well as f(0) = 0 to see that
25the only remaining term is
Γ|xD=µ(vA) = −u′
D(vD − µ(vA)) < 0.
This is the marginal cost of eﬀort weighted by the probability to encounter a thief with a
valuation lower than vA. The derivative is negative, and therefore the necessary condition
for a maximum is not fulﬁlled. Hence, it cannot be optimal to deter type vA. Moreover,
continuity of Γ implies this is true not only for this type, who has measure zero, but for
some interval of types [v′
A,vA] with strictly positive measure. Therefore, property rights
enforcement must be imperfect.


































The second derivative with respect to r is
∂2uA
∂r2 =
vD1vD2(3rvD1vD2 − 4vA(vD1 + vD2))
2vA(vD1 + vD2)2 .
If we evaluate this at r+ we get
∂2uA




such that the second order condition for a maximum is fulﬁlled. Accordingly, r+ is A’s optimal
choice.
26B Strategic restraint and free entry in the market for appro-
priators
Assume in the population there are n individuals, nD of which defend their possession against
the remaining nA = n − nD appropriators. For simplicity, we assume both groups D and A
are comprised of homogeneous individuals. Each appropriator’s expected payoﬀ conditional




where ρij is the probability of i being the ﬁrst appropriator trying to break in at house j. If
there is more than one appropriator at the same house each is ﬁrst with equal probability.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium. As a consequence, mij = m = 1/nD. Then ρij is given
by



















1 − ˜ r
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˜ r is the probability with which appropriators j  = i attempt theft, which i takes as given. i’s















which follows from the reasoning in Section 6 and where we let vD = κvA. The parameter κ is
a measure of the valuation of group D relative to group A, or this group’s relative strength. We
focus on κ ≥ 2, since this implies without uncertainty property rights are perfectly enforced
in equilibrium. In a symmetric equilibrium we have r+
i = ˜ r and thus ρij = ρ. Therefore,
r+







27If r+ = 2(n − nA)/(3ρ(n,nA,r+)κ) < 1 in equilibrium each appropriator restrains himself











  − r = 0.
Because in equilibrium it cannot be the case that r = 0 and n − nA = 0 we can cancel terms
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The actual value of r+ depends on the parameter values. Note though that at r = 0 the






/(n − nA − r) > 0 and hence it is increasing in r for r ≤ 1 for sure, and
depending on n−nA also thereafter. The right-hand side is decreasing in κ. Therefore, there
exists at least one value of κ for which r+ = 1. By increasing κ further r+ decreases, stays
however positive unless κ → ∞. Hence for all n and nA there always exists a range of values
of κ such that the strategic restraint equilibrium exists.
What would happen now if there was open entry into the market for appropriators? Let
the payoﬀ of an appropriator be the equilibrium utility from the contest plus some constant
l, which we call leisure. The payoﬀ of a proprietor or defender is his expected utility in the
contest. Assume the utility of a defender in an equilibrium in which he enforces property rights
perfectly is β > l. The assumption we just made implies that the defender needs to produce
the good, which costs him time, before the appropriator can steal it. As a consequence, the
appropriator has more leisure, l, than the proprietor. This assumption guarantees that at
least some individuals choose to become appropriators in equilibrium. The second assumption
states that this leisure utility is not enough to dominate the utility of being a proprietor with
perfectly enforced property. This assumption guarantees that at least some individuals choose
to become proprietors and to produce a good in equilibrium.
The equilibrium number of appropriators is such that a no-arbitrage condition between
becoming an appropriator or proprietor holds. In equilibrium individuals will sort themselves
into appropriators and defenders until the relative mass of appropriators is such that the ex-
pected utility from becoming an appropriator is equal to the utility of a proprietor. Note that
28with perfect property rights the outside option is strictly positive, β > 0 and an appropriator
gets nothing but l. This can never be an equilibrium. On the other hand a situation with
only proprietors cannot be an equilibrium as well. No one would invest in enforcement and
hence there is an incentive to become an appropriator. The only possible equilibrium is one
where enforcement is imperfect and hence appropriators earn a positive rent which makes
them exactly indiﬀerent to becoming proprietors. Hence, in any equilibrium property rights
enforcement needs to be imperfect.
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